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“I Have Realized That I Tell Stories Only Survivors Can Tell”

****

Bent Sørensen, Aalborg University

In memory of French-American, Jewish writer Raymond Federman who died last October, I propose to re-examine an aspect of his novels and essays pertaining to his writing of the trauma of losing his entire family in the Holocaust (he memorializes them as four X-X-X-Xs) and the survivor's guilt he dealt with in the subsequent six decades. I want to particularly query his representational strategies in the light of a quote recently published in an interview with Federman, performed in 2007 by Reiko Nitta:

“The major difference between well-known novels about the Holocaust and mine is the language. Other books are written in what is called the passive traditional white language. I am writing about absurdity, about the obscenity of the Holocaust. So I am using an obscene language.” (Federman in Nitta, 2009:25) 

My question is, simply put: Is it possible to write that trauma as a picaresque, obscene and absurd tale, all the while maintaining decorum and respect for oneself as a human being, let alone for the victims? 

****

Raymond Federman has hitherto been best known in the critical community as a practitioner and theorist of experimental fiction and as the inventor of terms such as ‘surfiction’ – a writing of fiction on top of already existing fictions or memories (Federman refuses to distinguish between the two) and ‘critifiction’, denoting a type of literature where literary theory and practice meet in an acutely self-aware and playful form of mythographic metafiction. Lately however, Federman’s status as a Holocaust writer and his Jewish ancestry have increasingly come into critical focus, thanks not least to volumes such as Camelia Elias’s collection of essays Federman Frenzy from 2008 and the aforementioned book of interviews by Reiko Nitta from 2009.

The fictional works analyzed in this paper will include The Voice in the Closet (1979) and The Two-Fold Vibration (1982), and in addition I’ll draw on some of the essays collected in the volume entitled Critifiction: Postmodern Essays (1993).

****

On the issue of trauma, traumatic knowledge and the writing thereof, Geoffrey Hartmann says the following: 

“The [(post)Freudian] theory holds that the knowledge of trauma, or the knowledge which comes from that source, is composed of two contradictory elements. One is the traumatic event, registered rather than experienced. It seems to have bypassed perception and consciousness, and falls directly into the psyche. The other is a kind of memory of the event, in the form of a perpetual troping [literally ‘turning’, but Hartman also means ‘metaphorizing’] of it by the bypassed or severely split (dissociated) psyche.” (Hartmann, 2004, n.p.)

It is clear that it is the second of these two elements, the one dealing with the subject’s attempt to narrativize the traumatic event, which is interesting in this connection. The psyche in fact has the capacity to use cognitive strategies such as emplotment or metaphorization/troping to order the transgressive events and investigate them in such a way that their traumatic excess energies are cathected. Only thus can the trauma content itself be salvaged from the falling into the psyche. This process, however, is well-nigh impossible to initiate, as Hartmann elucidates in the following:

“Traumatic knowledge, then, would seem to be a contradiction in terms. It is as close to nescience as to knowledge. Any general description or modeling of trauma, therefore, risks being figurative itself, to the point of mythic fantasmagoria [sic!]. Something “falls” into the psyche, or causes it to “split.” There is an original inner catastrophe whereby/in which an experience that is not experienced (and so, apparently, not “real”) has an exceptional presence--is inscribed with a force proportional to the mediations punctured or evaded.” (Hartmann, 2004, n.p.)

It is therefore to be expected that initial trauma accounts are indirect or figurative. Indeed this can be used by the analyst as a starting point for creating a symptomatics of the trauma itself, in a process not too dissimilar from the interpretation of dreams or the reading of negations, proposed by Freud.

****

The traumatic event itself in Federman’s case is connected to the manner of his survival in connection with his family being rounded up for deportation to Auschwitz from Paris, a fate they shared with thousands of other French Jews after the German occupation. Federman’s mother hid Raymond in the closet on the landing outside their apartment, and he remained there for more than a day as all other Jews in the neighbourhood were taken to the station and forced to spend the night in cattle cars before being transported east. Eventually the boy was forced to defecate in the closet, an event that filled him with shame (he was around twelve and this apparent regression to infancy pained him). He ultimately determined that he had to risk leaving the closet, wrapped his stools in newspaper sheets he found in the closet, climbed to the roof of the building where he neatly deposited the package, after which he went in search of his lost family. He went to the railroad station but did not get there in time to get on the Auschwitz-bound train. Instead he caught a southbound freight-train, which he rode as far as he could stand the hunger he was feeling, after which he jumped off the train and went in search of a farm for food. The farmer discovered him in the potato field and took him in for the duration of the war, exploiting the young boy for hard physical labour for several years.

This sequence of events is told and retold in a number of Federman’s fictions throughout his career. I am basing the above account on the ones given in interviews and these fictions. The first sustained telling of some of these events make up the narrative of Federman’s short experimental fiction The Voice in the Closet, a text that does not use punctuation, capital letters or conventional syntax. It consists of 20 pages of prose, each laid out in a square box or closet of text:

“here now again selectricstud makes me speak with its balls all balls foutaise sam says in his closet upstairs but this time it's going to be serious no more masturbating on the third floor escaping into the trees no the trees were cut down liar it's winter now delays no more false starts yesterday a rock flew through the windowpane voices and all I see him from the corner of my eye no more playing dumb boys in the street laughing up and down the pages en fourire goofing my life it's a sign almost hit him in the face scared the hell out of him as he waits for me to unfold upstairs perhaps the signal of a departure in my own voice at last a beginning after so many detours relentless false justifications in the margins more to come in my own words now that I may speak say I the real story from the other side extricated from inside roles reversed without further delay they pushed me into the closet on the third floor I am speaking of us into a box beat me black and blue question of perspective how it should have started in my little boy's shorts I am speaking of me sssh it's summertime lies again we must hide the boy sssh mother whispering in her tears hurts to lose all the time in the courtyard bird blowing his” (VitC, I)

This writing bears the hallmarks of free associative speech or stream of consciousness, yet also the marks of heteroglossia, in that several voices intrude on the telling, here most notably that of the mother’s insistence directed both at her family to support her decision to hide the boy and at the boy to remain silent. The trauma is spoken of in fragments that are achronologically and acausally organized, creating a series of displacements of subject, object and agency typical of trauma discourse – “who did what to whom, when” becomes an unsolvable quandary. 

The Voice in the Closet culminates with its page 10 circling around the shameful event of the defecation in an inappropriate space, yet here the discourse has become markedly more intellectual as the speaking subject attempts to reassemble itself via analysis of the destiny of his family, aided by the benefit of hindsight:

“remade into lampshades past moments old dreams I am back again in the actuality of my fragile predicament backtracked into false ambiguities smelling my hands by reflex out of the closet now to affirm the certainty of how it was annul the hypothesis of my excessiveness on which he postulates his babblings his unqualifiable design as I register the final absence of my mother crying softly in the night my father coughing his blood down the staircase they threw sand in their eyes struck their back kicked them to exterminate them his calculations yes explanations yes the whole story crossed out my whole family parenthetically xxxx into typographic symbols while I endure my survival from its implausible beginning to its unthinkable end yes false balls all balls ejaculating on his machine reducing my real life to the verbal rehearsals of a little boy half naked trying to extricate himself as he goes on formulating yet another paradox I witness to substitute a guilty gesture for my innocent pleasure call that cleverness indeed to impose on my predicament his false notions of order truth plausibility down the corridor triptoes now listens to voices”

Emotions are making themselves manifest, a first step towards the resolution of the numbness of the trauma event, as mother and father are described in detail as they suffer and express their pain by crying and coughing. In the whole, the trauma event never quite resolves itself from its falling into the psyche as neither hyperintellectualization, nor charting of emotions succeeds for the speaker. The repeated references to ejaculation became apparent as a troping of the process of producing excess words, masturbation as a trope for (type)writing on the “selectricstud” machine. The Voice in the Closet circles back on itself, ending with a new command from “those above” to speak no more of that which cannot be spoken of:

“he extracts words from other tongues to exact his speechlessness ubiquitous wanting to be everywhere at the same time he disperses his words everywhere at the same time to commit transgression for those above those below negates absence time now then to be serious upstairs in his closet foutaise to speak no more my truth to say from fingers federman here now again at last”

****

In Raymond Federman’s 1982 novel The Two-Fold Vibration, science-fiction tropes are employed to retell the story of a person waiting to be deported to the space colonies by a ruthless future government which attempts to purge society of deviants and undesirables. The theme of Jewishness has been introduced at a very early stage of the narrative, but its importance has been played down by “Federman”, as the narrator is named: “[T]he old man [the main protagonist] had to struggle all his life to conquer vanity and indolence and [was] of Jewish origin on top of that, not that this fact makes much difference here, not at all, it’s quite irrelevant to this story, or barely relevant” (18-19).

This statement, which amounts to a first reflex of trauma negation, is belied by the events to unfold later in the narrative where it turns out that the old man’s ethnicity and family’s destiny is of highly marked significance. This is already evident a few pages later, where we completely casually learn about his parents’ and sisters’ fate: “His parents were so poor, […] and did they suffer, their entire lives, from hunger and humiliation, before they were exterminated, and his two sisters too, xxxx out, is how he always put it” (22). The 4 Xs again discretely represent the erasure of the four humans constituting the family unit, not only of “the old man”, but also of Federman, the author: father, mother and two sisters. The denial of the importance of the Jewish ethnicity is x’ed out by the reality of the Holocaust experienced re-doubled on both the authorial (“real”) and character (“fictitious”) levels.

The re-doubling of character and author’s Jewish destiny is quadrupled by the Jewishness of two additional characters and co-narrators in the novel: Namredef (Federman spelled backwards) and Moinous (Moi-Nous or ‘MeWe’), who confess their ethnicity, but deny that it colours their contemporary life – unlike that of “the old man”:

“Is it because you’re Jewish, asked Namredef totally out of breath, I’m Jewish too and I don’t get excited like you when I am in the midst of Germans, you can’t blame them all, is it because your entire family was exterminated by the Nazis, so what, mine too was remade into lampshades at Auschwitz, or have you forgotten

And mine too, mine too, intervened Moinous who was holding on to his side as he trotted along splashing in the rain (153)”

“The old man” replies with his own denial of the importance of ethnicity, but interestingly uses a Jewish term of derogation (“schnorrers”) to characterise the two characters:

“The old man shrugged his shoulders, It has nothing to do with that, and besides I’m not worked up, I’m just being philosophical, that’s all, the two of you always confuse ideology with sentiment, yes it’s amazing how you two schnorrers always have to reduce everything to your Jewish sentimentality (153)”

Later the reader, as well as all the individual personae, is addressed with a similar term from Yiddish discourse, again denoting mild but playful derogation:

“It’s all there, you schmucks, inside the words, teller and told, survivors and victims unified into a single design, if you read the text carefully then you’ll see appear before you on the shattered white space the people drawn by the black words, flattened and disseminated on the surface of the paper inside the black inkblood, that was the challenge, never to speak the reality of the event but to render it concrete into the blackness of the words. (225)”

The trauma content of the narrative is here displaced by various narrative strategies: the quadrupling of the narrator/characters (but this of course in a return of the repressed mirrors the fourness of the exterminated family unit), the blood into mere ecriture, or “inkblood”, the use of satire to discuss the (ir)rationale of the cruelty of the Nazi extermination, and finally the picaresque nature of the novel which encompasses various adventures at casinos in Europe, the Beyreuth Opera, and political rallies with a thinly disguised Jane Fonda as guest star/speaker in the US in the early 70s – culminating with the wish-fulfilment dream of the old man eloping with the oversexed Jane – displaced into a tellingly named June Fanon…

Federman thus uses humour to organize the trauma content into chunks that can be ordered in some sort of – albeit absurd – narrative logic. Still this novel ends in much the same fashion as The Voice in the Closet: after everyone else has been deported to the (non-existent) space colonies the old man and his dog Sam (named after Beckett, of course) are left pathetically behind, not even deemed worthy of X-ing out. Here the survivor’s guilt becomes much more foregrounded than in VitC.

****

Can a survivor be permitted the use of absurd gallows’ humour to cathect his trauma energy? The pertinence of this question becomes even clearer when we return to Federman’s non-fiction on the poetics of postmodern metafiction, as well as his personal essays on how and why to be a Jewish writer. What is evident here is that to him the future is fraught with much the same perils as the past, as history was. We are doomed to repeat our failures if we do not allow space for human in(ter)vention.

Therefore the project of writing Jewish history remains an impossibility, yet a necessity for the individual Jewish writer. The scale on which this is possible for Federman is captured in the anguish of the following quote: “I am often asked”, Federman writes, “as a survivor of the Holocaust and as a writer: ‘Federman tell us the story of your survival’. And I can only answer: ‘There is no story. My life is the story. Or rather, the story is my life.’” (Federman, 2001)

Federman’s ability to write of history can only be realised via remembrance as narrative strategy: one writes in order to prevent collective forgetfulness, and remembrance reveals that which is sous rature, erased but still legible. “It is necessary to speak”, he says, “to write, and keep on speaking and writing (lest we forget) about the Jewish Holocaust during the Nazi period even if words cannot express this monstrous event. It is impossible to speak or write about the Holocaust because words cannot express this monstrous event” (Federman, 2001). We cannot go on telling it, but we must go on. The ultimate logic of absurdity forces Federman to state the necessity of his trauma strategies as follows:

“Take my case for instance. What do you think I would be today if it were not for Hitler? Do you know what I would be today? I mean if nothing had happened. No war, no occupation, no collaboration, no deportation, no extermination – no Holocaust. Yes, do you know what I would be today? A tailor. A little Jewish tailor slaving in a tailor shop on Boulevard des Italiens in Paris. Or else an instituteur in some intellectually retarded school in the province of France. But let me assure you, I would not be a writer (an experimental writer, I am told), dealing with such an important topic as the Holocaust. No, I would not be here, making up my life as I go along. Certainly not. Therefore, funny as it may seem, disturbing and grotesque as it may sound, Hitler in a way was my savior. Yes, I know it’s laughable, preposterous, but it’s true.” (Federman, 2001)

The answers to the ethical question of strategies of trauma representation are therefore naturally ethical in their own right. If what it takes to warn the present and future generations of the madness of the past is exaggeration, grotesque and absurd humour and obsessive repetition, then so be it. If trauma can only be cathected by writing that to some extent traumatizes its reader, then so be it. If one’s Jewishness must be denied to reinforce one’s humanity, then, damn it you schmucks, so be it!
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